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Abstract
This paper gives a complete characterization of the equilibria in Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) model
of “Limits of Arbitrage”. We show that expected wealth (the arbitrageurs’ objective function) is a
possibly non-concave function of investment and that the relation between investment and prices is
not necessarily continuous or single-valued or well-defined. As a result, “anything is possible”: non-
existence or multiplicity of equilibria may arise, and sunspots may govern the equilibrium selection
in the latter case.
1 Introduction
In an ingenious paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)1 (henceforth: SV) argue why arbitrage may fail when
it is most profitable. Their argument is based on the idea that the amount of funds an arbitrageur
manages responds positively to the returns he generates (performance-based arbitrage, PBA). To get
an idea of the implications of PBA for the efficiency of arbitrage in bringing asset prices in line with
fundamental values, suppose the price of an already undervalued asset falls further. Then money
is withdrawn from the arbitrageurs invested in this asset, even though the widening gap between
fundamental value and the actual price level implies that arbitrage becomes even more profitable.
The SV model is a cornerstone of behavioral finance. This is because behavioral finance has identified
empirically many kinds of irrational behavior in financial markets, but there are few models which
help explain why arbitrage is limited, so that irrational behavior leads to mispricing (see, e.g., Barberis
and Thaler, 2003, pp. 1056-1057).
Using numerical examples, SV derive a number of interesting implications from their apparently simple
model. The aim of the present article is to show that the model’s simplicity is more apparent than real.
We provide a complete characterization of the equilibria in the SV model2 and find that “anything is
possible”: an equilibrium may fail to exist, or if one exists, it may not be unique. To prove the former
assertion, we have to investigate types of equilibria not considered by SV. In the latter case, sunspots
may govern the selection of an equilibrium.
We show that the equilibrium conditions in the SV model can be summarized in a two-way relationship
between (period-2) prices and (period-1) investment: prices and investment constitute an equilibrium
when (a) the price clears the market given the individuals’ demands and (b) the demands maximize
expected wealth (the relevant objective function) given prices. The non-existence and multiplicity
results are due to properties of this two-way-relationship which have not so far received appropriate
attention. (a) Due to the fact that the amount of funds arbitrageurs may lose is constrained by
the amount of funds under management, their objective function is possibly non-concave. (b) The
correspondence relating (period-2) prices to (period-1) investment is possibly discontinuous or multi-
valued or not even well-defined. This is due to a positive feedback effect: due to PBA, higher period-2
prices raise period-2 funds under control, thereby driving up period-2 prices.3
1See also Chapter 4 in Shleifer (2000).
2This follows Zwiebel’s (2002, pp. 1219-1220) call for a rigorous treatment of the insightful models in Shleifer’s (2000)
Inefficient Markets.
3While (b) the latter problem is ruled out by the parameter assumptions made by SV, (a) the non-concavity problem
can arise for parameters satisfying the SV assumptions.
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(a) Our main result is that the non-concavity problem causes an existence problem. To get an idea
why, notice that an increase in period-1 investment raises the arbitrageurs’ payoffs if the price recovers
at time 2, but decreases the amount of funds under management and, hence, wealth if the noise trader
shock worsens. A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium with an interior solution to
the problem of maximizing expected wealth is that these two effects balance out. Assume this is the
case for marginal variations of period-1 investment. Assume further that the prices ensuing from the
arbitrageurs’ investment decisions are such that if an arbitrageur is fully invested in period 1 and the
noise trader shock grows, then he loses all the funds under his management. This implies that expected
wealth is increasing in the arbitrageur’s investment for investment levels close to full investment,
because the wealth-reducing effect of additional investment vanishes. It follows that expected wealth
is a non-concave function of investment (flat for low investment levels and increasing for higher levels),
and full investment maximizes wealth, violating the supposition that there is an equilibrium with less-
than-full investment. (b) The fact that the relation between investment and prices is not well-behaved
does not cause an existence problem of its own. However, it opens up the possibility of multiple
equilibria, equilibrium selection via sunspots, and perverse comparative statics.
Section 2 briefly recapitulates the assumptions of the SV model. In Section 3, we define the relevant
sorts of equilibria and state the conditions they satisfy. To motivate the subsequent analysis, we present
a numerical example which leads to non-existence at the outset. The main results on existence and
uniqueness are in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
This section gives a brief exposition of the SV model. Consider an asset market with three types of
agents, noise traders, arbitrageurs, and investors in arbitrage funds. Time is discrete, and there are
three time periods. The supply of the asset is inelastic and normalized to unity. The asset’s fundamental
value is V (> 0). So the asset is under-valued or valued correctly, depending on whether demand is
less than or equal to V , respectively. At time 3, the asset is valued correctly.
The noise traders’ demand for the asset in period 1 is QN1 = V − S1, where 0 < S1. At time 2,
with probability q (0 < q < 1), their demand is QN2 = V − S2, where S1 < S2 < V (“noise trader
misperceptions deepen”); with probability 1 − q, on the other hand, QN2 = V , and the asset price
returns to its fundamental value.
There is a continuum of unit length of identical arbitrageurs. Their funds under management in
periods 1 and 2 are denoted F1 and F2, respectively. F1 is exogenous and satisfies 0 < F1 < S1.
Their investments in the asset at times t = 1 and t = 2 are denoted D1 and D2 respectively, where
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0 ≤ Dt ≤ Ft, t ∈ {1, 2}. Non-invested funds are stored at zero interest. Let p1 denote the period-1 price
and p2 the period-2 price in case of worsening noise trader expectations and x the gross return on F1.
If noise trader misperceptions deepen, then x = 1+ (p2/p1− 1)D1/F1. Moreover, due to performance-
based arbitrage, period-2 assets under control of the arbitrageurs are F2 = max{F1(ax + 1 − a), 0}.
Following SV, we focus on the case a > 1. Arbitrageurs maximize final wealth, W , in period 2 and
expected final wealth, EW in period 1.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Definition
In equilibrium,
p1 = V − S1 + D1. (1)
If noise trader expectations deepen:
p2 = V − S2 + D2 (2)
F2 = max
{
F1 + aD1
(
p2
p1
− 1
)
, 0
}
(3)
W ≡ F2 +
(
V
p2
− 1
)
D2. (4)
Equations (1)-(3) correspond to equations (3), (2), and (6), respectively, in SV (pp. 39-41).4 If, on the
other hand, noise trader expectations recover, then the period-2 price if V and W = F1+aD1(V/p1−1).
The arbitrageurs’ investments maximize (expected) wealth:
D1 = argmax
D1
: EW s.t.: 0 ≤ D1 ≤ F1 and (3) (5)
D2 = argmax
D2
: W s.t.: 0 ≤ D2 ≤ F2 (6)
(cf. SV, p. 42).
Definition: An equilibrium is a tuple (p1, p2,D1,D2, F2,W ) ≥ 0 that satisfies (1)-(6).
4The only differences are that, other than SV, we do not impose D2 = F2 or F2 > 0. We need the slightly more
general formulation of the equations because, for one thing, it will turn out that equilibria with D2 = F2 may exist and,
for another, to prove non-existence of an equilibrium we have to take into account allocations with F2 = 0.
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3.2 Preview
To motivate the subsequent analysis, we start with an example which illustrates that equilibria of the
types considered by SV may fail to exist due to the non-concavity of the arbitrageurs’ expected wealth
function.
Example 1: Let V = 1, F1 = 0.1, a = 3, S1 = 0.2, S2 = 0.7, and q = 0.1. We pose the following
question: is there an equilibrium with p2 < V and F2 > 0 and with either full (D1 = F1) or partial
(D1 < F1) investment? The answer will be in the negative. The proof that other types of equilibria
do not exist either is postponed to Section 4. p2 < V implies D2 = F2. Using the supposition F2 > 0,
(1)-(3) become
p1 = 0.8 + D1 (7)
p2 = 0.3 + F2 (8)
F2 = 0.1 + 3D1
(
p2
p1
− 1
)
. (9)
Eliminating p2 and F1 from (7)-(9) yields
p2 =
(0.4 − 3D1)(0.8 + D1)
0.8− 2D1 . (10)
Suppose, to begin with, there is an equilibrium in which arbitrageurs are fully invested in period 1 (i.e.,
D1 = F1). From (7) and (10), p1 = 0.9 and p2 = 0.15. However, from (9), F2 = −0.15, a contradiction.5
Next, consider equilibria in which arbitrageurs hold back funds in period 1 (i.e., D1 < F1). Expected
wealth is
EW ≡ 0.9
[
0.1 + 3D1
(
1
p1
− 1
)]
+
0.1
p2
[
0.1 + 3D1
(
p2
p1
− 1
)]
. (11)
In an equilibrium with 0 < D1 < F1, EW must be constant in D1, which implies p2 = p1/(10 − 9p1).
Hence, using (7),
p2 =
0.8 + D1
2.8− 9D1 . (12)
Solving (10) and (12) yields D1 = 0.0354 and p2 = 0.3366. From (7), p1 = 0.8354. Now consider
the expected wealth function. Given the equilibrium prices and taking the non-negativity of F2 (cf.
equation (3)) into account explicitly, (11) becomes
EW ≡ 0.9(0.1 + 0.5911D1) + 0.2971max{0.1 − 1.7912D1, 0}.
For D1 < 0.0558 (= 1/1.7912), the max-term is positive, and EW is in fact constant in D1. However,
for D1 > 0.0558, the max-term becomes zero, so that d(EW )/dD1 = 0.5320 > 0. Expected wealth
5It may be noted that SV’s (p. 46) “stability condition”, viz. that aF1 < p1 if D1 = F1, is satisfied (as 0.3 < 0.9).
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Figure 1: Case distinctions
is non-concave in D1, and each arbitrageur’s optimal choice is to be fully invested (i.e., D1 = 0.1), a
contradiction. This answers the question posed at the outset: an equilibrium with p2 < V and F2 > 0
and with either full (D1 = F1) or partial (D1 < F1) investment does not exist.6 In Section 4 we show
that no other kind of equilibrium (e.g., with p2 = V or with F2 = 0 or with D1 = 0) exists either and
that similar problems (and others as well) occur for a wide range of parameter values.
3.3 Undervaluation equilibria
We now start our systematic analysis of equilibria. To begin with, we focus on the case p2 < V . The
discussion of equilibria is postponed until Subsection 3.4. We proceed in four steps. In step 1, we
provide a convenient partition of the parameter space. Step 2 is concerned with the correspondence
between aggregate period-1 investment, D1, and the period-2 price level in the case of deepening noise
trader expectations, p2. Next, we solve the arbitrageurs’ wealth maximization problem, which yields
D1 as a function of p2 (step 3). Step 4 introduces different types of equilibria we have to distinguish
in the subsequent section on existence and uniqueness.
6One might object that the non-existence result depends on the assumption that the funds under management are
distributed symmetrically across arbitrageurs: the non-existence of an equilibrium with less-than-full investment is due
to the fact that each arbitrageur prefers to invest all the funds under his management (i.e., F1 = 0.1) when p1 = 0.8354
and p2 = 0.3366, since expected wealth is increasing in D1 for D1 > 0.0558. This raises the question of whether an
equilibrium with aggregate investment D1 = 0.0354, p1 = 0.8354 and p2 = 0.3366 prevails if the majority of arbitrageurs
hold funds no greater than 0.0558 and choose to invest nothing and the remainder of the aggregate funds is concentrated
in the hands of a few “big” and fully invested arbitrageurs. In the present example, the answer is: no. The mass of
arbitrageurs with funds no greater than 0.0558 is bounded away from unity. So the funds under management of the “big”
arbitrageurs is greater than (0.1− 0.0558 =) 0.0442. This is more than consistent with the stipulated equilibrium prices
(i.e., with D1 = 0.0354).
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Step 1: Case distinctions
From (4) and p2 < V , we have dW/dD2 = V/p2 − 1 > 0. Hence,
D2 = F2. (13)
From (1)-(3) and (13),
p2 = max {A(D1) + F (D1)p2, V − S2} , (14)
where
A(D1) ≡ V − S2 + F1 − aD1, F (D1) ≡ aD1
V − S1 + D1 . (15)
There is a positive feedback effect: higher period-2 prices, p2, raise period-2 funds under control, F2,
thereby driving up p2. F (D1) is measure of the strength of this positive feedback effect. We have
A(D1)
>
=
<
0 ⇔ D1
<
=
>
V − S2 + F1
a
≡ D01 (16)
and
F (D1)
<
=
>
1 ⇔ D1
<
=
>
V − S1
a− 1 ≡ D
∞
1 . (17)
Notice
F1
<
>
D01 ⇔ a
<
>
1 +
V − S2
F1
(18)
and
F1
<
>
D∞1 ⇔ a
<
>
1 +
V − S1
F1
. (19)
Furthermore,
D01
<
>
D∞1 ⇔ a(F1 − S2 + S1)
<
>
F1 − S2 + V.
Therefore, D01 < D
∞
1 for S2 > S1 + F1, and
D01
<
>
D∞1 ⇔ a
<
>
1 +
V − S1
F1 − S2 + S1 for S2 < S1 + F1. (20)
These inequalities can be used to divide the parameter space into four subspaces (see Figure 1). Let
Ω ≡ (V, S1, S2, a, F1) (> 0) denote the vector of model parameters.
Case 1: Let Ω1 ≡ {ω ∈ Ω| a < 1 + (V − S2)/F1}. Then, F1 < min{D01 ,D∞1 } for ω ∈ Ω1.
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Case 2: D01 < F1 < D
∞
1 for ω ∈ Ω2 ≡ {ω ∈ Ω| 1 + (V − S2)/F1 < a < 1 + (V − S1)/F1}.7
Case 3: D01 < D
∞
1 < F1 for ω ∈ Ω3, where
Ω3 ≡
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣V < S1 + F1, 1 + V − S1F1 < a < 1 +
V − S1
F1 − S2 + S1
}
∪
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣V > S1 + F1, S2 < S1 + F1, 1 + V − S1F1 < a < 1 +
V − S1
F1 − S2 + S1
}
∪
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣V > S1 + F1, S2 > S1 + F1, a > 1 + V − S1F1
}
.
Case 4: D∞1 < D
0
1 < F1 for ω ∈ Ω4, where
Ω4 ≡
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣V < S1 + F1, a > 1 + V − S1F1 − S2 + S1
}
∪
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣V > S1 + F1, S2 < S1 + F1, a > 1 + V − S1F1 − S2 + S1
}
.
Step 2: The correspondence between D1 and p2
Let p2(D1) : R+\D∞1 → R be given by
p2(D1) ≡ A(D1)1− F (D1) =
(V − S2 − aD1 + F1)(V − S1 + D1)
V − S1 − (a− 1)D1 . (21)
Let P2 = {p2| p2 > 0, p2 solves (14)}. Taking into account the relation between D01 and D∞1 , on the
one hand, and A(D1) and F (D1), on the other hand, in (16) and (17), it can be seen from Figure 2
that
P2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{p2(D1), V − S2}; for D1 < min{D01 ,D∞1 }
V − S2; for D01 ≤ D1 < D∞1
∅; for D∞1 < D1 < D01⎧⎨
⎩
{p2(D1), V − S2}; if p2(D1) ≥ V − S2
∅; if p2(D1) < V − S2
; for D1 > max{D01,D∞1 }
. (22)
For the four cases distinguished above, we obtain for D1 ∈ [0, F1] from (22) (see Figure 3):
Case 1:
P2 = max{p2(D1), V − S2}.
Case 2:
P2 =
⎧⎨
⎩
max{p2(D1), V − S2}; for D1 ∈ [0,D01)
V − S2; for D1 ∈ [D01 , F1]
.
7Notice that Ω1∪Ω2 is the set of parameters which satisfy SV’s (p. 46) stability condition, which states that aF1 < p1
if arbitrageurs are fully invested (i.e., D1 = F1).
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Figure 3: Relation between period-1 investment and period-2 prices
Case 3:
P2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{p2(D1), V − S2}; for D1 ∈ [0,D01)
V − S2; for D1 ∈ [D01 ,D∞1 )⎧⎨
⎩
{p2(D1), V − S2}; if p2(D1) ≥ V − S2
∅; if p2(D1) < V − S2
; for D1 ∈ (D∞1 , F1]
.
Case 4:
P2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max{p2(D1), V − S2}; for D1 ∈ [0,D∞1 )
∅; for D1 ∈ (D∞1 ,D01 ]⎧⎨
⎩
{p2(D1), V − S2}; if p2(D1) ≥ V − S2
∅; if p2(D1) < V − S2
; for D1 ∈ (D01 , F1]
.
Notice that p2(0) = V − S2 + F1 > V − S2. Furthermore, notice that if D1 < D∞1 , (21) implies
p2(D1)
>
<
V − S2 ⇔ a
<
>
F1
D1
(
1 +
V − S2
S2 − S1 + D1
)
. (23)
Hence,
p2(F1)
>
<
V − S2 ⇔ a
<
>
1 +
V − S2
S2 − S1 + F1 . (24)
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In case(s) 1 (and 2), we have F1 < D∞1 . So the inequalities in (24) subdivide the parameter set Ω1
into two subsets Ω11 and Ω12 (see Figure 1).
Case 1.1: For ω ∈ Ω11 ≡ {ω ∈ Ω| a < 1 + (V − S2)/(S2 − S1 + F1)}, we have p2(F1) > V − S2. Since
the term on the far right-hand side of (23) is decreasing in D1, (23) then implies that p2(D1) > V −S2
for all D1 ∈ [0, F1].8
Case 1.2: For ω ∈ Ω12 ≡ {ω ∈ Ω|ω ∈ Ω1, a > 1+ (V −S2)/(S2 −S1 +F1)}, we have p2(F1) < V −S2.
In cases 3 and 4, the inequalities in (23) are reversed.
The upshot of step 2 is that the correspondence relating the period-2 asset price to aggregate period-1
investment, D1, is not necessarily continuous or single-valued or defined over the entire interval [0, F1].
Step 3: Maximization of expected wealth
Expected wealth as of period 1 is
EW = (1− q)
[
F1 + aD1
(
V
p1
− 1
)]
+ q
V
p2
max
{
F1 + aD1
(
p2
p1
− 1
)
, 0
}
≡ EW (D1). (25)
Arbitrageurs maximize EW (D1) in D1, given p1 and p2. An increase in D1 has two effects on expected
wealth. For one thing, it raises the return in case of a return to fundamental valuation in period 2
(see the term in square brackets in (25)). For another, it reduces the amount of funds under control
at time 2 if p2 < p1, F2, which yield a certain rate of return V/p2 − 1 > 0 (see the max-expression
in (25)). The latter effect vanishes when the first term in the max operator becomes zero, i.e. when
D1 > D¯1, where
D¯1 ≡ F1
a
(
1− p2p1
) . (26)
For D1 < D¯1, differentiating (25) yields
EW ′ = aV
(
1
p1
− 1− q
V
− q
p2
) >
=
<
0 ⇔ p2
>
=
<
q
1
p1
− 1−qV
. (27)
For D1 > D¯1, EW ′ = aV (1− q)(1/p1−1/V ) > 0. Importantly, if D¯1 < F1 and EW ′ ≤ 0 for D1 < D¯1,
then expected wealth is a non-concave function of period-1 investment (see Figure 4).
Step 4: Types of equilibria
Having characterized how in the different cases we have to distinguish (step 1) period-1 investment,
D1, determines the period-2 price level, p2, (step 2) and how p2 affects the choice of D1 (step 3),
8Evidently, the case a = 1 can be treated analogously to case 1.1.
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we are now in a position to put the pieces together and characterize the equilibria of the model. Let
ψ(D1) : [0, F1]→ R be given by
ψ(D1) ≡ q1
V−S1+D1 −
1−q
V
. (28)
ψ(D1) is continuous and increasing and satisfies 0 < ψ(D1) < V − S1 + F1 (< V ) for all D1 ∈ [0, F1].
From (1), (27), and (28), we have
EW ′
>
=
<
0 ⇔ p2
>
=
<
ψ(D1) (29)
for D1 < D¯1.9 The following four types of equilibria comprise an exhaustive list of equilibria with
p2 < V :
Partial-investment equilibrium (PIE): 0 < D1 < F1, p2 ∈ P2, p2 = ψ(D1), p2 < V , and F1 ≤ D¯1.
No-investment equilibrium (NIE): D1 = 0, p2 = p2(0), p2 ≤ ψ(0), and EW (0) ≥ EW (F1) if F1 > D¯1.
Full-investment equilibrium 1 (FIE1): D1 = F1, p2 ∈ P2, p2 ≥ ψ(F1), and p2 < V .
Full-investment equilibrium 2 (FIE2): D1 = F1, p2 ∈ P2, p2 ≤ ψ(F1), D¯1 < F1, and EW (F1) ≥
EW (0).
3.4 Early recovery
So far we have focused on the case p2 < V . Clearly, p2 cannot exceed V in equilibrium, as this requires
D2 = S2 > 0, and arbitrageurs would do better by decreasing D2. We now turn to “early recovery
equilibria (EREs)” with p2 = V .10 p2 = V implies that no capital gains are possible in period 2, so
9We have to distinguish carefully the aggregate investment in the asset and an individual arbitrageur’s investment,
which both equal D1. The aggregate D1 determines the prices p2 (via (21) and (22)) and ψ(D1) (via (28)). Equation
(29) says that if, for instance, p2 > ψ(D1), then EW
′ > 0 for each individual D1 < D¯1.
10An implicit assumption of the model is that the rate of return required by investors is zero. It may be noted in
passing that there is not a solvency problem for the arbitrageurs then. If the price recovers at time 2 (because noise
11
D1 = F1 (i.e., arbitrageurs are fully invested) and, using (3) and (1),
F2 = F1 + aF1
(
V
V − S1 + F1 − 1
)
> 0. (30)
Moreover, p2 = V and (2) imply D2 = S2, which requires F2 ≥ S2. Using (15) and (30), this condition
becomes
A(F1) + F (F1)V ≥ V. (31)
From Figure 2, we can infer the following.
Case 1: For ω ∈ Ω1, (31) is satisfied if, and only if, p2(F1) ≥ V .
Case 2: For ω ∈ Ω2, (31) is violated.
Cases 3 and 4: In these cases, (31) holds true if, and only if, p2(F1) ≤ V .
4 Existence and uniqueness
This section analyzes the existence, uniqueness, and comparative-statics properties of the equilibrium.
4.1 Existence
In this subsection, we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium. It turns out that ω ∈ Ω1 is sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium, while non-
existence may arise in all other parameter subspaces.
Theorem 1: For ω ∈ Ω11, an equilibrium exists.
Proof: Suppose there is a D∗1 (0 < D∗1 < F1) such that p2(D∗1) = ψ(D∗1). We assert that there is a PIE
with D1 = D∗1 and p2 = p2(D∗1).
Since p2(D1) > V −S2 (in case 1.1) and ψ(D1) < V for all D1 ∈ [0, F1], we have V −S2 < p2(D∗1) < V .
To show that a PIE prevails, we have to show that F1 ≤ D¯1. In case 1, if a PIE prevails, we have
D1 < D
∞
1 and, from (27), p2 < p1. Using (1), (26), and (21), it follows that F1 > D¯1 if, and only if,
S2 − S1 − (F1 −D1) + D1 > 0 and
a > 1 +
V − S2 + (F1 −D1)
S2 − S1 − (F1 −D1) + D1 . (32)
Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that F1 > D¯1, so that (32) holds and both the numerator
and the denominator in the fraction on the right-hand side are positive. Then the fraction is no less
trader pessimism disappears or an ERE prevails), then the return on investment is positive, so that arbitrageurs can pay
F1 to their investors. If not, then investors withdraw F1 − F2 in period 2. The amount of remaining claims against the
arbitrageurs in period 3 is F1 − (F1 − F2) = F2. Since the rate of return on funds under management between periods 2
and 3 is V/p2 − 1 (> 0) in equilibrium except in an ERE, W > F2.
12
than (V − S2)/(S2 − S1 + F1), which is obtained by subtracting F1 −D1 (≥ 0) in the numerator and
adding 2(F1−D1) (≥ 0) in the denominator. So the supposition made contradicts the case distinction
made (viz., a < 1+(V −S2)/(S2−S1+F1) in case 1.1), and a PIE exists. Since p2(D1) (in case 1) and
ψ(D1) are both continuous on [0, F1], in order for there not to be an intersection, D∗1 , we must have
either p2(0) ≤ ψ(0) or p2(F1) ≥ ψ(F1). In the former case, there is a NIE. p2 < V − S2 is satisfied,
and p2 < V follows from p2(0) ≤ ψ(0) < V . F1 < D¯1 follows from the same reasoning as above. In the
latter case, there is a FIE1. Equation (21) ensures p2 = p2(F1) < V . Q.E.D.
Example 2: Consider the example presented by SV (p. 44): V = 1, F1 = 0.2, a = 1.2, S1 = 0.3, and
S2 = 0.4. As a = 1.2 < 4 = 1 + (V − S2)/F1 and a = 1.2 < 3 = (V − S2)/(S2 − S1 + F1), we have
ω ∈ Ω11, so that min{D01 ,D∞1 } = min{0.6667, 3.5} > 0.2 = F1. From (21) and (28),
p2(D1) =
(0.8 − 1.2D1)(0.7 + D1)
0.7− 0.2D1
ψ(D1) =
q(0.7 + D1)
1− (1− q)(0.7 + D1) .
As ψ(0) = 0.7q/(0.3 + 0.7q) < 0.7 < 0.8 = p2(0), there is not a NIE. As shown by SV (p. 44), there is
PIE for q > 0.3590 and a FIE1 for q < 0.3590.
Theorem 2: There exist parameters ω ∈ Ω12, ω ∈ Ω2, ω ∈ Ω3, and ω ∈ Ω4 such that an equilibrium
fails to exist.
Proof: Numerical examples suffice to prove the theorem.11
Example 1: Recall the example introduced in Subsection 3.2: V = 1, F1 = 0.1, a = 3, S1 = 0.2,
S2 = 0.7, and q = 0.1. As a = 3 < 4 = 1+(V −S2)/F1 and a = 3 > 1.5 = (V −S2)/(S2−S1+F1), we
have ω ∈ Ω12 (min{D01 ,D∞1 } = min{0.1333, 0.4} > 0.1 = F1). The example is constructed such that
an equilibrium fails to exist due to the non-concavity of the arbitrageurs’ expected wealth function
(cf. step 3 in Subsection 3.3). The functions p2(D1) and ψ(D1) defined in (21) and (28) are given by
the right-hand sides of (10) and (12), respectively. As shown in Subsection 3.2, a PIE does not exist
(since D¯1 = 0.0558 < 0.1 = F1).12 Moreover, as p2(0) = 0.4 > 0.2857 = ψ(0), a NIE does not exist. As
V −S2 = 0.3 < 0.4737 = ψ(F1), a FIE1 does not exist. In a FIE2, p1 = 0.9, p2 = p2(F1) = V −S2 = 0.3,
and D¯1 = 0.05 < 0.1 = F1.13 From (25), EW (F1) = 0.12 < 0.1233 = EW (0), so a FIE2 does not exist.
An ERE does not exist either, since p2(F1) = 0.15 < 1 = V , so that (31) is violated (alternatively,
this can be deduced from the fact that F2 = 0.1333 < 0.7 = S2 for p1 = 0.9, p2 = 1).
11Notice that, as Ω12 ⊂ Ω1, the non-existence result applies to parameters not ruled by SV’s stability condition.
12And this holds true for any distribution of F1 across arbitrageurs as well.
13Notice that different price levels, p1 and p2, yield different values for D¯1 (cf. (26)).
13
Example 3: Let V = 1, F1 = 0.2, a = 4.25, S1 = 0.3, S2 = 0.4, and q = 0.3. ω ∈ Ω2 as 1 + (V −
S2)/F1 = 4 < a = 4 < 4.5 = 1 + (V − S2)/F1. From (21) and (28),
p2(D1) =
(0.8 − 4.25D1)(0.7 + D1)
0.7− 3.25D1
ψ(D1) =
2.1 + 3D1
5.1− 7D1 .
In a PIE, D1 = 0.1524, p1 = 0.8524, and p2 = 0.6341. Then, however, D¯1 = 0.1837 < 0.2 = F1, so a
PIE does not exist. As p2(0) = 0.8 > 0.4118 = ψ(0), a NIE does not exist. As V −S2 = 0.6 < 0.7297 =
ψ(F1), a FIE1 does not exist. As EW (F1) = 0.2061 < 0.24 = EW (0) when D1 = F1 (so that p1 = 0.9
and p2 = 0.9), a FIE2 does not exist. As pointed out in Subsection 3.4, (31) is violated in case 2, so
that an ERE does not exist either (F2 = 0.2944 < 0.4 = S2 for p1 = 0.9, p2 = 1).14
Example 4: Let V = 1, F1 = 0.2, a = 6, S1 = 0.3, S2 = 0.4, and q = 0.4. Since V = 1 > 0.7 = S1+F1,
S2 = 0.4 < 0.5 = S1+F1, and a = 6 < 8 = 1+(V −S1)/(F1−S2+S1), we have ω ∈ Ω3. This example
highlights the importance of the discontinuity in the mapping from investment levels, D1, to period-2
prices, p2. Equations (21) and (28) become
p2(D1) =
(0.8 − 6D1)(0.7 + D1)
0.7− 5D1
ψ(D1) =
2.8 + 4D1
5.8− 6D1 .
Since p2(0) = 0.8 > 0.4828, there is not a NIE. p2(D1) = ψ(D1) for D1 = 0.1206, which implies
p1 = 0.8206 and p2 = 0.6466. That this is not a PIE follows from the fact that D¯1 = 0.1572 <
0.2 = F1. For D1 ∈ (0.14, 0.2), we have p2(D1) > 1. This implies that there is not a PIE in this
interval (since p2(D1) > 1 > ψ(D1)) and that there is not a FIE1 either (since p2(F1) > 1 = V ). As
EW (F1) = 0.20 < 0.2533 = EW (0) when D1 = F1, a FIE2 does not exist. Finally, the condition for
the existence of an ERE in case 3 is violated: p2(F1) = 1.2 > 1 = V (F2 = 0.3333 < 0.4 = S2 for
p1 = 0.9, p2 = 1).
Example 5: Let V = 1, F1 = 0.2, a = 6, S1 = 0.3, S2 = 0.35, and q = 0.4. ω ∈ Ω4 because
V = 1 > 0.5 = S1+F1, S2 = 0.35 < 0.5 = S1+F1, and a = 6 > 5.3333 = 1+(V −S1)/(F1−S2+S1).
Equation (21) becomes
p2(D1) =
(0.85 − 6D1)(0.7 + D1)
0.7− 5D1
14In this example an equilibrium exists for different distributions of F1 across arbitrageurs. Suppose 90% of the
arbitrageurs have funds 0.18, and 10% “big” arbitrageurs have 0.38 (notice that 0.9 · 0.18 + 0.1 · 0.38 = 0.2 = F1).
Suppose the former invest 0.1271 and the latter 0.38, so that D1 = 0.1524 (= 0.9 · 0.1271 + 0.1 · 0.38). This yields
p1 = 0.8524, p2 = 0.6341, and D¯1 = 0.1837. An equilibrium prevails because any investment between 0 and 0.18 yields
the same level of expected wealth for the former arbitrageurs and being fully invested is the optimal choice for “big”
arbitrageurs.
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The equation for ψ(D1) (equation (28)) reads as in Example 4. Since p2(0) = 0.85 > 0.4828, there
is not a NIE. p2(D1) = ψ(D1) if, and only if, D1 = 0.1451, p1 = 0.8451, and p2 = 0.6858. As
D¯1 = 0.1768 < 0.2 = F1, this is not an equilibrium. As shown in Subsection 3.3 (step 2), both p2(D1)
and V −S2 are potential equilibrium price levels for D1 ∈ (D∞1 , F1]. However, p2(F1) = 1.05 (> 1 = V )
contradicts the definition of a FIE1. For p2 = V − S2 = 0.65 and D1 = F1 = 0.2, we have p1 = 0.9,
D¯1 = 0.12 < 0.2 = F1, but EW (F1) = 0.20 < 0.2431 = EW (0), so that a FIE2 does not exist either.
As in the previous example, the fact that p2(F1) = 1.05 > 1 = V rules out an ERE.
This proves Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
Remark: The discontinuity of the relation between D1 and p2 alone is not sufficient to obtain a non-
existence result. To see this, suppose the condition F1 ≤ D¯1 is satisfied for any prices, p1 and p2, which
potentially occur in equilibrium. In cases 1 and 2, max{p2(D1), V − S2} ≥ ψ(D1) for all D1 ∈ [0, F1],
or max{p2(D1), V − S2} ≤ ψ(D1) for all D1 ∈ [0, F1], or max{p2(D1), V − S2} = ψ(D1) for some
D1 ∈ (0, F1), so that a NIE or a FIE1 or a PIE, respectively, exists. Replacing [0, F1] with [0,D∞1 ),
the same argument holds true for case 3 (recall that p2 = V − S2 for D1 ∈ [D01,D∞1 )). In case 4, if
ψ(F1) ≤ V −S2, then there is a FIE 1 with p1 = V −S1+F1 and p2 = V −S2. If ψ(F1) > V −S2, then
ψ(D∗1) = V −S2 for some D∗1 ∈ (D01 , F1), and there is a PIE with p1 = V −S1 +D∗1 and p2 = V −S2.
4.2 Uniqueness
In this subsection, we show that an equilibrium, if one exists, is not necessarily unique.
Theorem 3: There exist parameter values such that the equilibrium is not unique.
Proof: Again it suffices to construct an example.
Example 6: Let V = 1, F1 = 0.2, a = 10, S1 = 0.4, S2 = 0.6, and q = 0.8 (so that ω ∈ Ω3).
There are, then, three equilibria. First, there is a PIE with D1 = 0.0289 (< 0.06 = D01), p1 = 0.6289,
p2 = 0.5755, and D¯1 = 0.2356 (> 0.2 = F1). Second, as p2(F1) = 0.9333 and ψ(F1) = 0.7619, there is
a FIE1 with p1 = 0.8 and p2 = 0.9333. For p2 = V − S2 = 0.4 and D1 = F1 = 0.2, we have p1 = 0.8,
D¯1 = 0.04 < 0.2 = F1, but EW (F1) = 0.14 < 0.44 = EW (0), so that a FIE2 does not exist. Third,
since p2(F1) ≤ V , there is an ERE with p1 = 0.8, p2 = 1, F2 = 0.7, and D2 = 0.6.
Example 7: As another example, let V = 1, F1 = 0.2, a = 35, S1 = 0.4, S2 = 0.5, and q = 0.8 (so
that ω ∈ Ω4). As p2(D1) > ψ(D1) for all D1 ∈ [0,D∞1 ), there is not a NIE or a PIE with D1 < D∞1 .
p2(D1) = ψ(D1) for D1 = 0.0392. This, however, implies D¯1 = 0.0691 < 0.2 = F1, so a PIE does not
prevail. As 1 = V > p2(F1) = 0.8129 > 0.7619 = ψ(F1), there is a FIE1 with p1 = 0.8 and p2 = 0.8129.
Interestingly, suppose D1 = F1, such that p1 = 0.8, and p2 = V − S2 = 0.5. Then, D¯1 = 0.0152 and
EW (F1) = 0.39 > 0.36 = EW (0), so that a FIE2 prevails. Finally, as p2(F1) = 0.8129 ≤ 1 = V , there
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is also an ERE (with F2 = 1.95 > 0.5 = S2). So as in Example 6, three equilibria exist, but here all
three equilibria entail that arbitrageurs are fully invested. Q.E.D.15
4.3 Sunspots
A sunspot equilibrium is an equilibrium such that at least two different period-2 price levels, p2,
possibly occur, with given non-zero probabilities. Multiplicity of equilibria naturally gives rise to
sunspot equilibria.
Theorem 4: There exist parameter values such that sunspot equilibria exist.
Proof: As usual, an example suffices to prove the theorem. Reconsider Example 7. Let p21 = 0.8129,
p22 = 0.5, and p23 = 1. These are the equilibrium price levels, p2, in the FIE1, the FIE2, and the ERE,
respectively. Furthermore, let p1 = 0.8. Suppose (conditional on worsening noise trader expectations)
arbitrageurs expect the period-2 price p2i to prevail with probability πi, where
∑3
i=1 πi = 1 and πi ≥ 0
for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, with strict inequality for at least two i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Analogously to (25), expected
wealth as of period 1 is
EW (D1) =
3∑
i=1
πi
(
0.2
[
0.2 + 35D1
(
1
0.8
− 1
)]
+ 0.8
1
p2i
max
{
0.2 + 35D1
( p2i
0.8
− 1
)
, 0
})
. (33)
As D1 = 0.2 maximizes expected wealth for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, it also maximizes (33). In period 2,
arbitrageurs choose D2 = F2 = 0.3129, D2 = F2 = 0, or D2 = S2 = 0.5, depending on whether p21,
p22, or p23 is realized. Q.E.D.
4.4 Comparative statics
This subsection shows that, as one would expect, the fact that the functions which determine the
equilibrium are non-well-behaved possible gives rise to perverse comparative statics properties. For
the sake of brevity, we restrict attention to the impact of changes in the period-2 noise trader shock,
S2, on the period-2 price, p2 (cf. SV, Proposition 2 and 4, pp. 44, 46).
Theorem 5: dp2/dS2 < 0 for ω ∈ Ω1∪Ω2. There exist parameters ω ∈ Ω3∪Ω4 such that dp2/dS2 > 0.
Proof: Consider a full-investment equilibrium with p2 = p2(F1). Differentiating (21) and evaluating
the derivative at D1 = F1 yields
dp2
dS2
= − V − S1 + F1
V − S1 − (a− 1)F1 . (34)
15It may be noted that SV (p. 46) presume that if their stability condition is violated, then the only period-2 equilibrium
price level is V −S2. As the stability condition is violated in cases 3 and 4, Examples 6 and 7 show that other equilibria
may emerge as well.
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In cases 1 and 2 (where F1 < D∞1 ), the denominator on the right-hand side of (34) is positive, so
that dp2/dS2 < −1. Moreover, in cases 1 and 2, a PIE satisfies p2 = max{p2(D1), V − S2} = ψ(D1),
where p2(D1) and ψ(D1) are given by (21) and (28), respectively. As an increase in S2 decreases
max{p2(D1), V − S2} and leaves (28) unaffected, p2 falls. This proves dp2/dS2 < 0 in cases 1 and
2. In cases 3 and 4, the denominator in (34) is negative, so that dp2/dS2 > 0 in a full-investment
equilibrium with p2 = p2(F1). Q.E.D.
Contrary to what one might expect, the comparative statics are not necessarily perverse for PIEs with
D1 > D
∞
1 . To see this, assume in case 4, ψ(D1) intersects p2(D1) from above for D1 ∈ (D∞1 , F1). An
increase in S2 shifts p2(D1) upward, such that p2 falls.
Example 8: Let V = 1, F1 = 0.2, a = 10, S1 = 0.4, S2 = 0.5, and q = 0.8 (ω ∈ Ω4). There is
a PIE with D1 = 0.0868 (> 0.0667 = D∞1 ), p1 = 0.6868, p2 = p2(D1) = 0.6370, and D¯1 = 0.2754
(> 0.2 = F1). If S2 rises to 0.51, the period-2 price falls to p2 = 0.6304 (D1 = 0.0807, p1 = 0.6807,
D¯1 = 0.2705).
5 Conclusion
A thorough analysis of equilibria in SV’s seminal model of limits of arbitrage that “anything is possi-
ble”: non-existence, multiplicity, and sunspot equilibria. Thus, given limits of arbitrage, non-rational
behavior in the stock market may give rise, not only to mispricing, but also to non-well-behaved
demand and supply correspondences which possibly lead to more fundamental allocation problems.
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Appendix
Proof of (23)
p2(D1)
>
<
V − S2
V − S2 + F1 − aD1
V − S1 − (a− 1)D1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(V − S1 + D1)
>
<
V − S2
(V − S2 + F1 − aD1)(V − S1 + D1)
>
<
(V − S2)[V − S1 − (a− 1)D1]
F1(V − S1 + D1)
>
<
aD1 (S2 − S1 + D1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
a
<
>
F1
D1
(
1 +
V − S2
S2 − S1 + D1
)
.
Proof of (31)
F1 + aF1
(
V
V − S1 + F1 − 1
)
≥ S2
V − S2 + F1 − aF1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A(F1)
+
aF1
V − S1 + F1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡F (F1)
V ≥ V
A(F1) + F (F1)V ≥ V.
1
Proof of (32)
F1
>
<
D¯1 ≡ F1
a
(
1− p2
p1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
a
(
1− p2
p1
)
>
<
1
a
[
1− V − S2 − aD1 + F1
V − S1 − (a− 1)D1
]
>
<
1
a
S2 − S1 − (F1 −D1)
V − S1 − (a− 1)D1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>
<
1
a[S2 − S1 − (F1 −D1)]
>
<
V − S1 − (a− 1)D1
a [S2 − S1 − (F1 −D1) + D1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>
<
V − S1 + D1
a
>
<
V − S1 + D1
S2 − S1 − (F1 −D1) + D1
a
>
<
1 +
V − S2 + (F1 −D1)
S2 − S1 − (F1 −D1) + D1 .
2
Maple output for the examples
Example 1
> V:=1; S_1:=0.2;a:=3;F_1:=0.1;S_2:=0.7;q:=0.1;
V := 1
S 1 := 0.2
a := 3
F 1 := 0.1
S 2 := 0.7
q := 0.1
> Dinfty:=(V-S_1)/(a-1);
Dinfty := 0.4000000000
> D0=(V-S_2+F_1)/a;
D0 = 0.1333333333
> p_2:=(V-S_2+F_1-a*D_1)*(V-S_1+D_1)/(V-S_1-(a-1)*D_1);
p 2 :=
(0.4 − 3D 1 ) (0.8 + D 1 )
0.8− 2D 1
> psi:=q/(1/(V-S_1+D_1)-(1-q)/V);
ψ :=
0.1
1
0.8 + D 1
− 0.9
> plot([p_2,psi,V-S_2],D_1=0..F_1,y=0.1..0.5,discont =
> true,labels=[D_1,‘‘]);
3
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
D_1
> solve(p_2=psi,D_1);
−0.8000000000, 0.3349907290, 0.03537964136
> D_1star:=.3537964136e-1; p_1star=V-S_1+D_1star;
> p_2star=eval(psi,D_1=D_1star);
D 1star := 0.03537964136
p 1star = 0.8353796414
p 2star = 0.3366317250
> bard1:=F_1/(a*(1-.3366317250/.8353796414));
bard1 := 0.05583178823
Example 2
> V:=1; S_1:=0.3;a:=1.2;F_1:=0.2;S_2:=0.4;q:=0.5;
V := 1
S 1 := 0.3
a := 1.2
F 1 := 0.2
S 2 := 0.4
4
q := 0.5
> Dinfty:=(V-S_1)/(a-1);
Dinfty := 3.500000000
> D0=(V-S_2+F_1)/a;
D0 = 0.6666666667
> p_1:=V-S_1+D_1;
> p_2:=(V-S_2+F_1-a*D_1)*(V-S_1+D_1)/(V-S_1-(a-1)*D_1);
p 1 := 0.7 + D 1
p 2 :=
(0.8 − 1.2D 1 ) (0.7 + D 1 )
0.7 − 0.2D 1
> psi:=q/(1/(V-S_1+D_1)-(1-q)/V);
ψ :=
0.5
1
0.7 + D 1
− 0.5
> plot([p_2,psi,V-S_2],D_1=0..F_1,y=0.5..V,discont =
> true,labels=[D_1,‘‘]);
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
D_1
> solve(p_2=psi,D_1);
−0.7000000000, 1.625718035, 0.1742819648
> D_1star:=.1742819648; p1=V-S_1+D_1star; p2=eval(psi,D_1=D_1star);
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D 1star := 0.1742819648
p1 = 0.8742819648
p2 = 0.7766438285
> bard1:=F_1/(a*(1-.7766438285/.8742819648));
bard1 := 1.492384701
Example 3
> V:=1; S_1:=0.3;a:=4.25;F_1:=0.2;S_2:=0.4;q:=0.3;
V := 1
S 1 := 0.3
a := 4.25
F 1 := 0.2
S 2 := 0.4
q := 0.3
> Dinfty:=(V-S_1)/(a-1);
Dinfty := 0.2153846154
> D0=(V-S_2+F_1)/a;
D0 = 0.1882352941
> p_2:=(V-S_2+F_1-a*D_1)*(V-S_1+D_1)/(V-S_1-(a-1)*D_1);
p 2 :=
(0.8 − 4.25D 1 ) (0.7 + D 1 )
0.7 − 3.25D 1
> psi:=q/(1/(V-S_1+D_1)-(1-q)/V);
ψ :=
0.3
1
0.7 + D 1
− 0.7
> plot([p_2,psi,V-S_2],D_1=0..F_1,y=-0.1..1.1,discont =
> true,labels=[D_1,‘‘]);
6
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
D_1
> solve(p_2=psi,D_1);
−0.7000000000, 0.4366571407, 0.1524184896
> D_1star:=.1524184896; p_1star=V-S_1+D_1star;
> p_2star=eval(psi,D_1=D_1star);
D 1star := 0.1524184896
p 1star = 0.8524184896
p 2star = 0.6340715895
> bard1:=F_1/(a*(1-.6340715895/.8524184896));
bard1 := 0.1837159641
Example 4
> V:=1; S_1:=0.3;a:=6;F_1:=0.2;S_2:=0.4;q:=0.4;
V := 1
S 1 := 0.3
a := 6
F 1 := 0.2
S 2 := 0.4
7
q := 0.4
> Dinfty:=(V-S_1)/(a-1);
Dinfty := 0.1400000000
> D0=(V-S_2+F_1)/a;
D0 = 0.1333333333
> p_2:=(V-S_2+F_1-a*D_1)*(V-S_1+D_1)/(V-S_1-(a-1)*D_1);
p 2 :=
(0.8 − 6D 1 ) (0.7 + D 1 )
0.7− 5D 1
> psi:=q/(1/(V-S_1+D_1)-(1-q)/V);
ψ :=
0.4
1
0.7 + D 1
− 0.6
> plot([p_2,psi,V-S_2],D_1=0..F_1,y=-0.1..1.3,discont =
> true,labels=[D_1,‘‘]);
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
D_1
> solve(p_2=psi,D_1);
−0.7000000000, 0.4238593785, 0.1205850660
> D_1star:=.1205850660; p_1star=V-S_1+D_1star;
> p_2star=eval(psi,D_1=D_1star);
D 1star := 0.1205850660
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p 1star = 0.8205850660
p 2star = 0.6465767720
> bard1:=F_1/(a*(1-.6465767720/.8205850660));
bard1 := 0.1571927114
Example 5
> V:=1; S_1:=0.3;a:=6;F_1:=0.2;S_2:=0.35;q:=0.4;
V := 1
S 1 := 0.3
a := 6
F 1 := 0.2
S 2 := 0.35
q := 0.4
> Dinfty:=(V-S_1)/(a-1);
Dinfty := 0.1400000000
> D0=(V-S_2+F_1)/a;
D0 = 0.1416666667
> p_2:=(V-S_2+F_1-a*D_1)*(V-S_1+D_1)/(V-S_1-(a-1)*D_1);
p 2 :=
(0.85 − 6D 1 ) (0.7 + D 1 )
0.7− 5D 1
> psi:=q/(1/(V-S_1+D_1)-(1-q)/V);
ψ :=
0.4
1
0.7 + D 1
− 0.6
> plot([p_2,psi,V-S_2],D_1=0..F_1,y=-0.1..1.3,discont =
> true,labels=[D_1,‘‘]);
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0.4
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0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
D_1
> solve(p_2=psi,D_1);
−0.7000000000, 0.4076297028, 0.1451480750
> D_1star:=.1451480750; p_1star=V-S_1+D_1star;
> p_2star=eval(psi,D_1=D_1star);
D 1star := 0.1451480750
p 1star = 0.8451480750
p 2star = 0.6858421172
> bard1:=F_1/(a*(1-.6858421172/.8451480750));
bard1 := 0.1768396040
Example 6
> V:=1; S_1:=0.4;a:=10;F_1:=0.2;S_2:=0.6;q:=0.8;
V := 1
S 1 := 0.4
a := 10
F 1 := 0.2
S 2 := 0.6
10
q := 0.8
> Dinfty:=(V-S_1)/(a-1);
Dinfty := 0.06666666667
> D0=(V-S_2+F_1)/a;
D0 = 0.06000000000
> p_2:=(V-S_2+F_1-a*D_1)*(V-S_1+D_1)/(V-S_1-(a-1)*D_1);
p 2 :=
(0.6− 10D 1 ) (0.6 + D 1 )
0.6− 9D 1
> psi:=q/(1/(V-S_1+D_1)-(1-q)/V);
ψ :=
0.8
1
0.6 + D 1
− 0.2
> plot([p_2,psi,V-S_2],D_1=0..F_1,y=-0.1..1.3,discont =
> true,labels=[D_1,‘‘]);
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
D_1
> solve(p_2=psi,D_1);
−0.6000000000, 0.8311234224, 0.02887657760
> D_1star:=.2887657760e-1; p_1star=V-S_1+D_1star;
> p_2star=eval(psi,D_1=D_1star);
D 1star := 0.02887657760
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p 1star = 0.6288765776
p 2star = 0.5754827918
> bard1:=F_1/(a*(1-.5754827918/.6288765776));
bard1 := 0.2355617114
Example 7
> V:=1; S_1:=0.4;a:=35;F_1:=0.2;S_2:=0.5;q:=0.8;
V := 1
S 1 := 0.4
a := 35
F 1 := 0.2
S 2 := 0.5
q := 0.8
> Dinfty:=(V-S_1)/(a-1);
Dinfty := 0.01764705882
> D0=(V-S_2+F_1)/a;
D0 = 0.02000000000
> p_2:=(V-S_2+F_1-a*D_1)*(V-S_1+D_1)/(V-S_1-(a-1)*D_1);
p 2 :=
(0.7− 35D 1 ) (0.6 + D 1 )
0.6− 34D 1
> psi:=q/(1/(V-S_1+D_1)-(1-q)/V);
ψ :=
0.8
1
0.6 + D 1
− 0.2
> plot([p_2,psi,V-S_2],D_1=0..F_1,y=-0.1..1.3,discont =
> true,labels=[D_1,‘‘]);
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D_1
> solve(p_2=psi,D_1);
−0.6000000000, 0.4950391816, 0.03924653270
> D_1star:=.3924653270e-1; p_1star=V-S_1+D_1star;
> p_2star=eval(psi,D_1=D_1star);
D 1star := 0.03924653270
p 1star = 0.6392465327
p 2star = 0.5863633774
> bard1:=F_1/(a*(1-.5863633774/.6392465327));
bard1 := 0.06907374023
> EW_1:=(1-q)*(F_1+a*F_1*(V/(V-S_1+F_1)-1));
EW 1 := 0.3900000000
> EW_0:=(1-q)*F_1+q*(V/(V-S_2))*F_1;
EW 0 := 0.3600000000
Example 8
> V:=1; S_1:=0.4;a:=10;F_1:=0.2;S_2:=0.5;q:=0.8;
V := 1
13
S 1 := 0.4
a := 10
F 1 := 0.2
S 2 := 0.5
q := 0.8
> Dinfty:=(V-S_1)/(a-1);
Dinfty := 0.06666666667
> D0=(V-S_2+F_1)/a;
D0 = 0.07000000000
> p_2:=(V-S_2+F_1-a*D_1)*(V-S_1+D_1)/(V-S_1-(a-1)*D_1);
p 2 :=
(0.7− 10D 1 ) (0.6 + D 1 )
0.6− 9D 1
> psi:=q/(1/(V-S_1+D_1)-(1-q)/V);
ψ :=
0.8
1
0.6 + D 1
− 0.2
> plot([p_2,psi,V-S_2],D_1=0..F_1,y=-0.1..1.3,discont =
> true,labels=[D_1,‘‘]);
0
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D_1
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> solve(p_2=psi,D_1);
−0.6000000000, 0.7831738072, 0.08682619283
> D_1star:=.8682619283e-1; p_1star=V-S_1+D_1star;
> p_2star=eval(psi,D_1=D_1star);
D 1star := 0.08682619283
p 1star = 0.6868261928
p 2star = 0.6369566573
> bard1:=F_1/(a*(1-.6369566573/.6868261928));
bard1 := 0.2754492040
15
